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1 Introduction
As in the previous legal year,1 2011-12 has seen two themes dominate the criminal
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Most importantly, in Ambrose v Harris,2 HM
Advocate v P,3 McGowan v B4 and Jude v HM Advocate,5 the Supreme Court has
been called upon to clarify various aspects of its controversial recent decision in
Cadder v HM Advocate.
6 Secondly, in R v Gnango,7 it has been required to elucidate
the law on joint enterprise responsibility and, at least implicitly, to confront the
age-old question of how far public policy arguments should overtake the need for
strict legal rules when determining an appropriate legal response in this area.
2 Explaining Cadder
In the 2010 case of Cadder, the Supreme Court unanimously followed the
approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Salduz v Turkey,8 and held
that, absent compelling reasons, denying an accused person access to a solicitor
whilst he was detained by the police violated his rights under Articles 6(1) and
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6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).9 In doing so, the
Supreme Court overruled a series of recent unanimous decisions of the Scottish
High Court of Justiciary (particularly Paton v Ritchie,10 Dickson v HM Advocate11
and HM Advocate v McLean12); rendered at least thirty years of past practice
unlawful;13 and caused a serious diplomatic rift between itself and the Scottish
Government.14
Notwithstanding that this decision directly resulted in over one thousand
cases being dropped,15 and drew an immediate legislative response from the
Scottish Parliament,16 Cadder in fact left various questions as to its ambit
unanswered. A selection of these issues have since visited the Supreme Court
for clarification in the last judicial year. In its responses, the Supreme Court has
arguably limited the remit of Cadder in both physical and temporal scope, and
likely reined back its future impact.
2.1 Adverse admissions obtained prior to arrival at an
authorised detention centre
The first clarification sought from the Supreme Court concerned whether the
rule in Cadder applied to adverse admissions obtained during police interroga-
tion, but prior to the arrival of a suspect at an authorised detention facility. In
Ambrose, a four to one majority of the Supreme Court (Lord Kerr dissenting) held
that it did not. In the view of the Court, the rule only applied to interrogations
conducted in a formal custodial institution. In M therefore, where the suspect
was questioned at his own home as a witness (before his involvement as an of-
fender was suspected) the rule in Cadder did not automatically prevent reliance
upon his admissions. The matter was accordingly remitted to the High Court of
Justiciary.
A more complicated situation arose in G, a case in which the appellant was
questioned in his flat whilst handcuffed (seemingly after having been arrested
for another offence). Here, the Supreme Court held (rightly, it is submitted,
9
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since the only factual difference was physical location) that this was akin to
being in custody. In the view of Lord Hope, the act of handcuffing represented
a `significant curtailment of his freedom of action'.17 The rule in Cadder was
therefore engaged.
2.2 Adverse admissions obtained after the right to legal
advice has been waived
The second clarification sought concerned whether the rule in Cadder applied
where an accused was in fact offered legal advice, but waived that right without
taking separate legal advice as to whether to do so. In McGowan, the Supreme
Court once more held that it did not (Lord Kerr again dissenting in part).18 At
the same time however, the majority noted that any waiver must be `voluntary,
informed and unequivocal'.19 They added that the test for this would be
particularly stringent where the accused was considered vulnerable.20
The interpretation of this ruling was shortly thereafter considered in Birnie, a
case in which the accused was eighteen years old and had just been informed that
he was to be detained for the weekend. In such circumstances, Lord Kerr thought
it `inescapable that his decision to [waive his right to counsel] could not in any
circumstance be regarded as an effective waiver of his right'.21
2.3 Evidence obtained as a result of adverse admissions—the
fruit of the poisoned tree?
The third and final clarification sought from the Supreme Court concerned
whether evidence obtained as a result of adverse admissions from interrogations
which violated the rule in Cadder should itself be automatically excluded under
the `fruit of the poisoned tree' rule. In P, the Supreme Court held that this was a
matter upon which neither Salduz nor Strasbourg jurisprudence more generally
provided guidance; indeed the Strasbourg Court had purposefully declined to do
so.22 Accordingly, the Supreme Court could again only remit the matter to the
High Court of Justiciary.
17
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2.4 Overarching trends—conciliation, deference and the rise
of constitutionalism
Three overarching trends can be discerned from these decisions. The first is the
more conciliatory tone adopted by the Supreme Court in its approach to Scottish
criminal law. In part, this is achieved by clear and continuous restatement of
its own jurisdiction. In Ambrose for example, Lord Hope was quick to note that
the role of the Supreme Court was limited to engaging in a `consideration of the
devolution issue which is raised'.23 The High Court of Justiciary, by contrast,
remained `the court of last resort in all criminal matters in Scotland'.24 This
contrasts with the view expressed by First Minister Alex Salmond in the wake
of Cadder that the Supreme Court was interfering in Scottish criminal law,25 a
jurisdiction denied to it by the Act of Union.26
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has also gone beyond merely clarifying its
own procedural role and has narrowed the application of the rule in Cadder as
a matter of substance. Although its basic premises now extend geographically to
custody both de jure and de facto, it has not been given universal application to any
interaction with the police. Further, the right can be waived without the need for
separate legal advice and evidence obtained from any unlawful admissions is not
itself automatically excluded, rulings which are clearly open to future abuse.
It is likely, then, that Cadder will have a much more limited future impact
thanmight previously have been thought. As Ferguson andWhite have noted, the
current position allows for `a restoration to as close to the pre-Cadder position as
is now possible, if the High Court chooses to so decide'.27 Given that the result
in Cadder was opposed by the Scottish Government, Parliament and judges (who
had themselves refused both the initial application and the original attempt to
appeal the decision to the Supreme Court), an opportunity to limit its scope is
one they can be expected to take without disappointment.
The second overarching trend is the continuing restrictive approach of the
Supreme Court to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. In this
regard, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not bind domestic courts to apply
judgments of the Strasbourg Court per se, only requiring that they are taken
23
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into account.28 In interpreting this rule, however, judicial practice has been
heavily influenced by the `mirror principle' set out by Lord Bingham in R v Special
Adjudicator ex parte Ullah.29 In particular, Lord Bingham thought that the duty
upon domestic courts was `to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it
evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less'.30
Increasingly, however, this rule has been understood as also including a
converse duty to do `no less, but certainly no more'.31 In Ambrose, for example,
Lord Hope argued that it was `not for this court to expand the scope of
the Convention right further than the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court
justifies'.32 Lord Kerr, by contrast, (albeit in a lone dissent) argued that:
[I]t is not open to courts of this country to adopt an attitude
of agnosticism and refrain from recognising such a right simply
because Strasbourg has not spoken […] It is therefore the duty of
this and every court […] to resolve the question of whether a claim
to a Convention right is viable or not, even where the jurisprudence
of the Strasbourg court does not disclose a clear current view.33
The third trend, underpinned by the issues outlined above, is the ongoing
evolution of the Supreme Court into a UK Constitutional Court. This change
has been driven by the increasing numbers of cases calling upon the Supreme
Court to exercise a form of constitutional review, either de jure over laws from
devolved institutions, or de factoover Acts of theUKParliament. At least at a prima
facie level, the Supreme Court is increasingly challenging many of the established
assumptions of the UK constitutional arrangement and gradually rewriting its
place within it.
That this evolution is occurring can be seen from the ever increasing number
of cases raising issues surrounding the compatibility of domestic law with the
ECHR and EU law,34 and with the division of powers under the devolution
settlements.35 Also of particular note are the recent decisions in R (Jackson)
28
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v Attorney General
36 and AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate37 on the
relationship between Acts of Parliament (both at the UK and devolved levels) and
common law. These decisions may well form the basis of a direct challenge to
sovereignty of Parliament in the future, but for now at least show the ongoing
empowerment of the Supreme Court in opposition to the other institutions of
State.
Although it is beyond the scope of this work to consider this transformation
of the UK constitutional system in any detail, this is a development worthy of
particular note. This is especially so given predictions by many commentators
and even some judges that the replacement of the judicial function of the House
of Lords with a Supreme Court would have little practical effect.38 Although this
shift has been happening for some time, it is clearly one which has been enhanced
(at least implicitly) by the physical move of the Court across Parliament Square to
the Guildhall.
3 Joint enterprise—policy at the expense of legal
clarity?
Joint enterprise has been a source of concern in recent years, particularly when
used in the prosecution of murder.39 Attempts by the courts to define the
scope of joint enterprise have come under criticism for allowing public policy
to become too intertwined with the legal principle.40 It has been argued that
the dominance of policy considerations, particularly directed towards deterring
gang-related violence, has led to an overly complex catch-all doctrine that can
36
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lead to injustice.41
In the case of Gnango,42 the Supreme Court was presented with an oppor-
tunity to clarify the law, albeit in the context of an unusual set of circumstances
concerning a gunfight between two people. The decision was timely. The judg-
ment was handed down just six weeks after the Home Office Justice Committee
on Joint Enterprise heard oral evidence in an inquiry into the issues arising out of
the doctrine. However, those hoping that the Supreme Court might `delve deeper
into the principles on joint enterprise that the extreme facts of the case demand'43
and revisit examination of the scope of the doctrine as a whole will sadly be dis-
appointed.
Considerations of public policy have long stood at the heart of joint enterprise
rules. As Sir Robin Cooke said in Chan Wing-Siu v R:
What public policy requires was rightly identified in the submis-
sions for the Crown. Where a man lends himself to a criminal enter-
prise knowing that potentiallymurderousweapons are to be carried,
and in the event they are in fact used by his partner with an intent
sufficient for murder, he should not escape the consequences by re-
liance upon a nuance of prior assessment, only too likely to have
been optimistic.44
It is evident from the judgment in Gnango that policy lay behind the lines of
reasoning mooted in support of the restoration of the conviction of the intended
victim of a fatal gunshot. As Lord Brown said, `[t]he general public would
in my opinion be astonished and appalled if in those circumstances the law
attached liability for the death only to the gunman who actually fired the fatal
shot'.45 Contrary to this observation, the authors have found no evidence of
public outrage following the Court of Appeal's decision to quash the conviction.46
41
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Further, it ought to be remembered that had the Supreme Court found in favour
of Gnango, he would not have got away scot-free. He had also been convicted
of attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life,
receiving a sentence of imprisonment of at least fifteen years.
Given the facts of the case, the concern with policy is understandable.
Gnango, a 17-year-old boy, had been in a shoot-out with another, referred to
as `Bandana Man' (B).47 During the course of the shoot-out, a passer-by, Ms
Pniewska, was killed by a stray bullet. The facts are horrendous. Nevertheless it
is important to note that it was not in dispute that B was the first to fire and that
B had fired the lethal shot. Had he been prosecuted, all were agreed that he would
have been found guilty of murder by reason of transferred malice. The elephant
in the room is the fact that to date B has not been prosecuted. It is submitted that
in B's absence, the securing of a conviction for Ms Pniewska's murder has been
at the cost of legal precision.
The facts of the case are straightforward, but the reasoning of the Supreme
Court is convoluted and does little to clarify the law. This is explored further in
this volume by Findlay Stark in ```A most difficult case'': on the ratio of Gnango'.
As Lord Kerr said in his dissenting judgment, `[v]arious bases on which Gnango
might—or should—be found guilty of the murder of Ms Pniewska have been
canvassed in the course of argument and in the judgments of other members
of the court'.48 The majority agreed that Gnango's murder conviction should
be restored, but were divided on the reasoning as to why.49 With unanimity,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the jury could not
properly have convicted on the basis of `parasitic accessory liability'—whether,
having agreed to commit an affray and in the course of committing the affray,
B went beyond what was agreed, by causing serious injury with intent, and
Gnango foresaw that risk that B would do so. Despite observing that it would
be `undesirable [...] if a practice developed of relying on the doctrine of parasitic
accessory liability to charge with murder parties to an affray who had not
themselves intended that it would result in serious injury',50 the Supreme Court
did so without clarifying the scope of this principle, leaving the waters ever
muddied. As Ormerod has observed, `this has serious implications, and it is
47
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48
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unclear why it is limited to affray'.51
Further evidence of policy overshadowing legal precision lies in the fact
that the jury was directed to consider only parasitic accessory liability and not
some other form of secondary liability. The issue of whether or not Gnango
encouraged or aided and abetted B to shoot at him and intended to do so was not
left to the jury. This approach, rejected by the trial judge, was advocated in the
leading judgment of Lords Phillips and Judge (LordsWilson and Dyson agreeing).
It is questionable, however, whether the Supreme Court could determine that
Gnango was properly convicted on that basis. As Lord Kerr said in his dissenting
judgment:
In the absence of a specific direction on Gnango's intention to
encourage B to shoot at him, I do not consider that the verdict of
the jury can be upheld on the basis that it was founded on their
conclusion that he either had the requisite intention or that the
virtually certain result of his firing at B was that he would return
fire and that Gnango knew that this was virtually certain to occur.52
It is regrettable that Gnango did not gainsay the conclusions of the Justice
Committee's inquiry that `[t]he lack of clarity over the common law doctrine
on joint enterprise is unacceptable for such an important aspect of the criminal
law'.53 Gnangomay have achieved a certain kind of justice for the tragic death of
Ms Pniewska, but there remains generally a growing sense that the application of
the law generally has led to injustice.54
Attempts to define the scope of joint enterprise have undoubtedly caused
a great deal of confusion and contributed to the increasing complexity of the
doctrine.55 In practice, joint enterprise is deployed to cover a variety of different
acts committed by secondary parties, from encouragement through presence56 to
direct participation in the fatal act. As such, even in cases of spontaneous violence,
the scope of joint enterprise `can be drawn so wide that those who would appear
51
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to have little or no culpability for the killing can be included within it'.57 As long
as the broad scope of joint enterprise continues to be justified on the basis that it
is a deterrent to gang-related crime, it is unlikely that Parliament will rise to the
challenge of clarifying the law. The previous Lord Chancellor and Secretary of
State for Justice, Kenneth Clarke, made the position clear when he said that the
government `remain[s] to be convinced about the need for law reform' on the issue
and that he was `keen to avoid consulting on measures that could weaken the law
in this area or undermine the Government's efforts to tackle crimes committed
by gangs'.58 For the foreseeable future, it looks like public policy will continue to
override legal clarity in the law of joint enterprise.
4 Conclusion
Given the controversy that Cadder and Gnango have caused, the issues raised are
likely to be seen again in the SupremeCourt in the near future. This is particularly
true in respect of Cadder, given that the constitutional arrangement of the
United Kingdom and its relationship with the European Court of Human Rights
continues to feature prominently in wider legal debate. The full implications of
Gnango are also yet to be seen. However, it can be expected that the courts will
hear substantial legal argument concerning its application to other, perhaps less
unusual, circumstances. Once again, we must wait to see how both cases develop
in the coming months. The 2012-13 review is awaited with interest.
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